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This paper introduces D-SLAMSpoof, a LiDAR spoofing attack that injects dynamically coordinated spurious point clouds into LiDAR scans to compromise SLAM in feature-rich environments. The attack designs both spatial injection shapes and temporally coordinated dynamic injection patterns guided by scan-matching principles, improving success rates in urban and indoor environments. They also propose ISD-SLAM, a defense method using inertial dead reckoning to detect and mitigate the spoofing attacks.
Even in feature-rich environments, LiDAR SLAM systems are vulnerable to a new spoofing attack (D-SLAMSpoof) that injects dynamically coordinated spurious point clouds, but can be defended against using inertial dead reckoning.
In this work, we introduce Dynamic SLAMSpoof (D-SLAMSpoof), a novel attack that compromises LiDAR SLAM even in feature-rich environments. The attack leverages LiDAR spoofing, which injects spurious measurements into LiDAR scans through external laser interference. By designing both spatial injection shapes and temporally coordinated dynamic injection patterns guided by scan-matching principles, D-SLAMSpoof significantly improves attack success rates in real-world, feature-rich environments such as urban areas and indoor spaces, where conventional LiDAR spoofing methods often fail. Furthermore, we propose a practical defense method, ISD-SLAM, that relies solely on inertial dead reckoning signals commonly available in autonomous systems. We demonstrate that ISD-SLAM accurately detects LiDAR spoofing attacks, including D-SLAMSpoof, and effectively mitigates the resulting position drift. Our findings expose inherent vulnerabilities in LiDAR-based SLAM and introduce the first practical defense against LiDAR-based SLAM spoofing using only standard onboard sensors, providing critical insights for improving the security and reliability of autonomous systems.
