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This paper explores the use of deep learning, specifically multilayer perceptrons (MLPs), to enhance differential fault attacks on lightweight stream ciphers ACORNv3, MORUSv2, and ATOM. The MLPs are trained to identify the location of single-bit faults injected into the cipher's state, achieving high accuracy in fault localization. By using a threshold-based method to optimize fault injections, the authors demonstrate improved secret recovery compared to traditional methods for ACORNv3 and MORUSv2, while also providing the first experimental fault attack results on ATOM.
Deep learning cracks lightweight stream ciphers, pinpointing fault locations with near-perfect accuracy and slashing the number of fault injections needed to recover secrets.
Lightweight cryptographic primitives are widely deployed in resource-constraint environment, particularly in the Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Due to their public accessibility, these devices are vulnerable to physical attacks, especially fault attacks. Recently, deep learning-based cryptanalytic techniques have demonstrated promising results; however, their application to fault attacks remains limited, particularly for stream ciphers. In this work, we investigate the feasibility of deep learning assisted differential fault attack on three lightweight stream ciphers, namely ACORNv3, MORUSv2 and ATOM, under a relaxed fault model, where a single-bit bit-flipping fault is injected at an unknown location. We train multilayer perceptron (MLP) models to identify the fault locations. Experimental results show that the trained models achieve high identification accuracies of 0.999880, 0.999231 and 0.823568 for ACORNv3, MORUSv2 and ATOM, respectively, and outperform traditional signature-based methods. For the secret recovery process, we introduce a threshold-based method to optimize the number of fault injections required to recover the secret information. The results show that the initial state of ACORN can be recovered with 21 to 34 faults; while MORUS requires 213 to 248 faults, with at most 6 bits of guessing. Both attacks reduce the attack complexity compared to existing works. For ATOM, the results show that it possesses a higher security margin, as majority of state bits in the Non-linear Feedback Shift Register (NFSR) can only be recovered under a precise control model. To the best of our knowledge, this work provides the first experimental results of differential fault attacks on ATOM.
