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The paper critiques the increasing use of "parasocial" to describe human-agent relations, arguing it's a misapplication that simplifies complex interactions. It traces the theoretical origins of parasociality, highlighting its specific characteristics (one-sided, character-governed, etc.) that don't align with the interactive nature of human-agent relationships. The author contends that this misapplication leads to flawed research, misdiagnosed effects, and devaluation of genuine human experiences with AI.
Calling human-AI interactions "parasocial" isn't just imprecise, it's actively harmful to understanding the complex social dynamics at play.
In discussions of human relations with conversational agents (CAs; e.g., voice assistants, AI companions, some social robots), they are increasingly referred to as parasocial. This is a misapplication of the term, heuristically taken up to mean"unreal."In this provocation, I briefly account for the theoretical trajectory of parasociality and detail why it is inaccurate to apply the notion to human interactions with CAs. In short,"parasocial"refers to a human-character relations that are one-sided, non-dialectical, character-governed, imagined, vicarious, predictable, and low-effort; the term has been co-opted to instead refer to relations that are seen as unreal or invalid. The scientific problematics of this misapplication are nontrivial. They lead to oversimplification of complex phenomena, misspecified variables and misdiagnosed effects, and devaluation of human experiences. Those challenges, in turn, have downstream effects on norms and practice. It is scientifically, practically, and ethically imperative to recognize the sociality of human-agent relations.
