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This paper introduces FIDEM, a framework that cryptographically binds IoT devices to their MUD profiles using Zero-Knowledge Proofs, addressing a critical security gap in the DHCP-based MUD URL issuance. FIDEM eliminates the need for PKI, minimizes manufacturer involvement, and supports secure profile updates, while remaining standard-compliant. Evaluation on ESP32 devices shows FIDEM introduces minimal overhead compared to standard DHCP and outperforms certificate-based methods in speed and energy efficiency.
Securely binding IoT devices to their MUD profiles doesn't have to be a PKI headache: FIDEM uses Zero-Knowledge Proofs to achieve this with minimal overhead and manufacturer involvement.
The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) standard enables enforcement of network restrictions for IoT devices based on their expected network traffic, as specified by manufacturers in an online MUD file. Devices advertise a URL pointing to this file, yet the standard does not define how to securely bind the issuing device to its profile. As a result, malicious devices can manipulate network policy enforcement by advertising valid URLs referencing genuine MUD profiles, but not intended for that device. Although MUD defines a certificate-based secure issuance method, current deployments rely on the insecure DHCP-based extension due to simpler integration. Existing solutions either depend on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), break standard compliance, require excessive active manufacturer involvement, or overlook secure profile updates. In this paper, we present FIDEM, a standard-compliant framework for securing DHCP-based MUD URL issuance. FIDEM provides cryptographic binding between IoT devices and their MUD profiles by leveraging Zero-Knowledge-Proof authentication, eliminating PKI reliance, minimizing manufacturers'involvement, and supporting secure profile updates. Formal analysis shows that FIDEM withstands stronger adversaries than in prior work, including supply-chain compromise and attacks using legitimate devices as cryptographic oracles. Our real-world evaluation on two reference constrained devices (ESP32-S3 and ESP32-C6) demonstrates minimal overhead compared to standard DHCP (approximately 5ms and 20mJ) and significant improvements over certificate-based benchmarks (approximately x20 faster, and 35% less energy).
