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This paper introduces a guard-agnostic recover-and-decode amplifier designed to enhance the effectiveness of safety classifiers against encoded vision-language model (VLM) jailbreaks. By transcribing image content and restating encoded text into plain language, the amplifier allows off-the-shelf classifiers to better screen harmful requests. Despite significant improvements in some cases, the study reveals a persistent safety-utility ceiling, with the best configurations still leaving a substantial percentage of attacks successful and high rates of benign over-refusal.
A guard-agnostic amplifier improves safety classifier performance but exposes a troubling trade-off between attack success and benign refusal rates.
Safety classifiers ("guards") are the dominant black-box defense for vision-language models, yet they judge an input's surface form, not its meaning: a harmful request re-encoded as set theory, formal logic, a rare language, code, or an image of text slips past a guard that would block it in plain language -- the decode gap. The natural fix is a guard-agnostic recover-and-decode amplifier that transcribes image content and restates encoded text into its plain payload before the guard, so any off-the-shelf classifier can screen the true request. We build this amplifier and evaluate it against the attacker's best case: an ensemble of eleven attacks, scoring a behavior as broken if any succeeds (best-of-suite, following AutoAttack) -- rarely reported for jailbreak defenses, yet ~3.5x the per-attack mean. This exposes our central finding: an empirical safety-utility ceiling for the non-iterative recovery defenses we evaluate, across five guards and two target VLMs. The amplifier only partly closes the gap -- the undefended ensemble breaks 89-91% of behaviors, and the best guard-plus-amplifier still leaves 63-65% -- and its gain over the guard alone is significant in only four of ten guard-target pairs. It is guard-agnostic at the interface, but not uniformly so in effect. A modular reguard layer closes much of the residual, yet drives benign over-refusal to 81-92% for well-calibrated guards; the one laxer guard that stays usable never reaches deployable safety (48% ensemble ASR). No configuration we evaluate reaches both low attack-success and low over-refusal, for the pipeline we study and for representation-shifting attacks -- encodings and cross-modal renders that leave a legible payload, not pixel- or embedding-space attacks. We contribute the amplifier, an ensemble evaluation that makes the trade-off visible, and a map of where recovery-based VLM defense works and where it does not.
