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This paper introduces a cryptographic distribution provenance system to defend against dependency confusion attacks in software package ecosystems. The system uses cryptographic registry identity, a dual-signature model (publisher and registry), and authoritative namespace binding to ensure packages originate from trusted registries. Analysis across eight ecosystems reveals that no existing system combines all these features, highlighting the vulnerability this system addresses.
Current package managers are surprisingly vulnerable: a single misconfiguration can silently allow attackers to inject malicious dependencies, a problem solved by this paper's cryptographically enforced provenance system.
Dependency confusion attacks exploit a structural gap in software distribution: once a package is installed, there is no cryptographic proof of which registry distributed it. Every existing defense is configuration-based and fails silently when misconfigured. We present a cryptographic distribution provenance system comprising three components: (1) cryptographic registry identity, where every registry holds an Ed25519 keypair and signs every artifact it distributes; (2) a dual-signature model, where the publisher signs at packaging time and the registry countersigns at publication time; and (3) authoritative namespace binding, where consumers pin registry fingerprints and the resolver cryptographically rejects artifacts from unauthorized registries. These create three defense layers requiring simultaneous compromise for a successful attack. A comparison across eight ecosystems (npm, Cargo, Hex.pm, PyPI, Go modules, Docker/OCI, NuGet, Maven) shows no existing ecosystem combines mandatory publisher signing, cryptographic registry identity, mandatory registry countersigning, and consumer-side cryptographic enforcement. The system extends to AI-generation provenance as a signed attribute and governance-enforced dependency resolution. A case study integrates distribution provenance with a three-layer runtime governance architecture, creating a four-phase lifecycle chain with no cryptographic gaps.
