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This paper introduces lightweight multi-secret-key protocols for private average aggregation in Federated Learning, addressing the limitations of conventional single-key homomorphic encryption that relies on strong non-collusion assumptions. By allowing each client to encrypt its updates under its own secret key and tracking ciphertext noise during decryption, the authors eliminate the need for large smudging noise, significantly reducing ciphertext size and implementation complexity. The proposed method demonstrates substantial improvements in communication and runtime performance compared to existing multiparty homomorphic encryption approaches while maintaining security against adversarial clients.
Reducing ciphertext expansion and online costs in Federated Learning could revolutionize how sensitive data is aggregated without compromising privacy.
Federated Learning enables multiple clients to train a shared model while keeping their local datasets isolated. However, the exchanged model updates may still leak sensitive information, making private aggregation a central building block in practical deployments, especially in the cross-silo setting. Homomorphic Encryption naturally fits the client--aggregator communication pattern of Federated Learning, but conventional single-key deployments rely on strong non-collusion assumptions. Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption removes this limitation, although recent attacks under restricted decryption access require large-variance smudging noise during collaborative decryption, which significantly increases ciphertext size and implementation complexity. In this work, we propose lightweight multi-secret-key protocols for private average aggregation based on RLWE-based Homomorphic Encryption. Our construction departs from the usual multiparty blueprint by avoiding the generation of a collective public key. Instead, each client encrypts its update under its own secret key, while the resulting ciphertexts remain compatible with homomorphic aggregation and collaborative decryption. By explicitly tracking and cancelling the ciphertext noise during decryption, the protocol removes the need for large $\lambda$-dependent smudging noise. We instantiate the construction with both exact BFV-based and approximate CKKS-based variants, prove its security in the semi-honest model against an adversary corrupting the aggregator and up to $L-1$ clients, and compare its communication and runtime performance with state-of-the-art MHE-based aggregation. Our results show that the proposed approach substantially reduces ciphertext expansion and online cost, while preserving practical homomorphic aggregation performance.
