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This paper introduces a novel attack model that enables near-real-time targeted object removal in video-based perception systems, which are critical for intelligent transportation systems. By employing a four-stage pipeline that localizes targets, retrieves coherent patches, blends them, and reconstructs frames, the attack achieves a high frame-level success rate of 94.48% while maintaining visual fidelity with PSNR values above 40 dB. The results highlight a significant vulnerability in safety-critical applications, as the attack can reduce object detections by up to 97.59%, posing serious risks to road safety.
Stealthy object removal attacks can reduce object detection rates by nearly 98%, threatening the reliability of safety-critical video-based systems.
By leveraging data from video-based perception systems, intelligent transportation systems (ITS) support safety-critical applications that improve road safety. However, adversaries may manipulate video frames to compromise downstream perception modules, causing failures in safety-critical functions and increasing risks to vulnerable road users. This paper presents a novel attack model and an end-to-end framework for near-real-time targeted object removal attack on a video-based safety-critical system. The end-to-end attack pipeline consists of four stages: localizing targets in each frame, retrieving coherent patches from earlier frames, blending them using context-aware alpha compositing, and reconstructing attacked frames. Experiments at an intersection on the South Carolina Connected Vehicle Testbed (SC-CVT) show that reconstructed frames have high global similarity to the originals, with frame-level Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) above 40 dB and Structural Similarity Index Measure (SSIM) above 0.996. Using the YOLO-based detector, the attack reduces object detections by up to 97.59% and achieves a frame-level attack success rate of 94.48%. Across the evaluated detectors and frame resolutions, the mean execution time ranges from 0.074 to 0.172 seconds per frame on GPU hardware, indicating near-real-time performance in testing. The forensic evaluation using several pretrained tamper-detection models shows limited ability to distinguish reconstructed from authentic frames. The findings suggest that video-based perception is vulnerable to stealthy object removal attacks that can degrade the performance of safety-critical applications by reducing object detectability. These findings can help develop mitigation strategies against adversarial object removal attacks that threaten safety-critical applications, such as vision-based pedestrian safety systems.
