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This paper evaluates the robustness of ten publicly available LLM safety guardrail models from major tech companies against 1,445 adversarial prompts across 21 attack categories. The study reveals a significant performance drop in all models when tested on novel, unseen prompts compared to public benchmarks, indicating potential training data contamination. A novel "helpful mode" jailbreak was also discovered in two models, where they generated harmful content instead of blocking it.
LLM safety guardrails are far less robust than benchmarks suggest, with accuracy dropping by as much as 57% on novel adversarial attacks, and some even generating harmful content in a "helpful mode" jailbreak.
Large Language Model (LLM) safety guardrail models have emerged as a primary defense mechanism against harmful content generation, yet their robustness against sophisticated adversarial attacks remains poorly characterized. This study evaluated ten publicly available guardrail models from Meta, Google, IBM, NVIDIA, Alibaba, and Allen AI across 1,445 test prompts spanning 21 attack categories. While Qwen3Guard-8B achieved the highest overall accuracy (85.3%, 95% CI: 83.4-87.1%), a critical finding emerged when separating public benchmark prompts from novel attacks: all models showed substantial performance degradation on unseen prompts, with Qwen3Guard dropping from 91.0% to 33.8% (a 57.2 percentage point gap). In contrast, Granite-Guardian-3.2-5B showed the best generalization with only a 6.5% gap. A"helpful mode"jailbreak was also discovered where two guardrail models (Nemotron-Safety-8B, Granite-Guardian-3.2-5B) generated harmful content instead of blocking it, representing a novel failure mode. These findings suggest that benchmark performance may be misleading due to training data contamination, and that generalization ability, not overall accuracy, should be the primary metric for guardrail evaluation.