Search papers, labs, and topics across Lattice.
This paper introduces Guarded-V2X, an inline semantic guardrail architecture designed to enhance the security of LLM-enabled vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems against prompt-level attacks. By integrating multiple safety mechanisms, including rule-based filtering and a lightweight safety classifier, the system effectively mitigates vulnerabilities that traditional V2X security measures overlook. Experimental results demonstrate that Guarded-V2X significantly reduces the acceptance of intrusions and eliminates unsafe completions in adversarial scenarios, all while adhering to real-time latency constraints.
Guarded-V2X slashes intrusion acceptance rates and eradicates unsafe outputs in V2X systems, proving that LLMs can be secured without sacrificing performance.
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems increasingly incorporate large language models (LLMs) for semantic tasks such as message summarization, operator assistance, and decision support at roadside units and edge nodes. Although these components are not part of safety-critical control loops, they introduce prompt-level attack surfaces that are not addressed by traditional V2X security mechanisms focused on authentication and message integrity. This paper presents Guarded-V2X, an inline semantic guardrail architecture for securing LLM-enabled V2X services under real-time constraints. The proposed system integrates rule-based ingress filtering, a lightweight safety classifier, policy-constrained structured generation, trusted-only retrieval, and post-decision adjudication to enforce machine-checkable safety boundaries prior to downstream execution. Guarded-V2X is evaluated using a four-stage experimental pipeline encompassing intrusion vulnerability analysis, calibration and latency benchmarking, guardrail validation, and robustness under adversarial stress. Experiments are conducted on a V2X-aligned simulated dataset derived from RSU advisories, operator messages, and annotated V2X message summaries. Results show that unguarded and prompt-only baselines retain residual vulnerability under multi-turn adversarial trials, while Guarded-V2X consistently reduces intrusion acceptance success rates and eliminates observed unsafe completions in two-turn settings, without exceeding latency budgets for V2X semantic advisory paths.
