Search papers, labs, and topics across Lattice.
The paper introduces Lacan, a novel protocol that effectively reconciles the conflicting requirements of anonymity and accountability in online communications. By allowing senders to maintain anonymity through on-path relays while establishing accountability through a contract with receivers, Lacan reduces the need for extensive public-key operations from per-packet to per-session. The protocol's robustness against malicious actors is ensured through a combination of successor proofs, traceable signatures, and key-committing encryption, demonstrating a significant advancement in secure communication frameworks.
Lacan achieves a groundbreaking balance between anonymity and accountability, enabling secure online interactions without compromising user privacy.
Anonymity and accountability are essential properties for our everyday activity on the Internet. However, they appear contradictory, and their reconciliation remains far from reality. Existing approaches fall short in this regard, as they either rely on an on-path trustee, per-packet authorization, per-packet public-key cryptography, or per-session intervention by a central authority. We propose Lacan, a protocol that reconciles anonymity and accountability within a realistic design. In Lacan, a sender enjoys anonymity provided by on-path relays, as long as she complies with a contract established with the receiver. Upon a contract violation, the verifier, an off-path trustee on behalf of the receiver, links the malicious message to the sender's identity indirectly via the packet, path, and session, thereby reducing public-key operations from per-packet to per-session. This linkage remains robust even against malicious relays and receivers, grounded in our novel chain of successor proofs for accountable path reconstruction, together with traceable signatures, path validation, and key-committing encryption. We analyze the anonymity and accountability, implement the protocol, and evaluate the performance.
