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Federated learning shares model updates rather than raw data, yet these updates can be inverted to reconstruct the clients' training data. Analytic reconstruction attacks, which invert a gradient in closed form, degrade as the batch grows: prior single-round attacks recover only about half of a batch of size $100$ even when the attacker fully controls the network parameters, and known upper bounds limit what any such method can recover. We establish a connection between gradient inversion and the theory of erasure-correcting codes, and use it to construct attacks that exceed these bounds. Our attacks recover batches exactly, together with every sample's label, from a single FedSGD round, and certify each recovery without ground-truth data. On eight image and tabular benchmarks they outperform prior single-round attacks by a wide margin. Even a passive attacker who only observes an honestly trained network recovers $94$--$100\%$ of ImageNet batches at sizes up to $128$, more than prior single-round attacks achieve even with active manipulation of the model, and in the active setting more than $90\%$ is recovered at batch sizes of several hundred. These results show that the privacy leakage of federated learning has been underestimated.
