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This paper introduces Proof in a Bottle (PiB), a novel approach to Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) that secures secret sharing against potential quantum attacks by utilizing pre-quantum commitments. By leveraging standard Pedersen commitments for zero-knowledge consistency during a pre-quantum period and anchoring a salted hash of the share set to an immutable ledger, PiB effectively decouples verifiability from long-term binding. The key result demonstrates that this method can protect current honest dealings from future quantum adversaries, ensuring long-term security for secret sharing protocols.
Quantum threats to secret sharing can be mitigated by a novel commitment strategy that ensures long-term security without compromising verifiability.
Traditional secret sharing techniques such as Verifiable Secret sharing (VSS) are vulnerable to quantum attacks by a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) running Shor's algorithm. We observe that the binding a VSS needs is required only at the moment of dealing, and this binding can be made before any CRQC exists. We propose Proof in a Bottle (PiB), which decouples verifiability from long-term binding: standard Pedersen commitments provide zero-knowledge, publicly checkable consistency during a pre-quantum window, while a salted, index-bound hash of the share set, anchored to an immutable public ledger, preserves the binding established in that window into the post-quantum era. The guarantee is explicitly a commit-now, reveal-later one: it protects today's honest dealings against tomorrow's quantum adversary.
