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This paper investigates the feasibility of achieving incentive compatibility (IC), weak local efficiency (wLE), and uniform pricing (UP) simultaneously in two-asset Automated Market Maker (AMM) mechanism design. It builds upon prior work by Chan, Wu, and Shi, who proposed an IC mechanism under the assumption of sequencing fairness. The core finding is a trilemma: any two of these properties can be achieved, but no mechanism can satisfy all three, revealing fundamental limitations in AMM design.
AMM designers face a stark choice: build a market that's fair, efficient, or incentivizes good behavior, because you can only pick two.
Blockchains have popularized the Automated Market Makers (AMMs), where users trade crypto-assets directly with a smart contract, governed by a pricing function embedded in the contract's code. Today, users of AMMs are often forced to accept unfavorable prices due to widespread front-running and back-running attacks, commonly known as Miner Extractable Value (MEV). Several earlier works show impossibility results suggesting that completely removing MEV at the consensus layer is impossible, partly because the consensus layer is agnostic of application-level semantics. For this reason, more recent works have advocated mechanism design approaches at the application (i.e., smart contract) level. We study a natural two-asset AMM mechanism design problem recently initiated and explored in prior work by Chan, Wu, and Shi, in which they proposed a mechanism that satisfies a surprisingly strong notion of incentive compatibility (IC), under the consensus assumption that the underlying blockchain provides sequencing fairness. In this paper, we investigate the (in)feasibility of simultaneously achieving IC and other desirable properties such as weak local efficiency (wLE) and uniform pricing (UP). At a high level, wLE requires that the mechanism should not leave any unfulfilled demand from users whose asking prices are not overly restrictive, and whose orders could have been executed directly against the pool. UP requires that all orders that get (partially) executed must trade at the same exchange rate. We unveil the underlying mathematical structure of AMM mechanism design, and our main results can be summarized as a trilemma-style theorem: among the desirable properties IC, wLE, and UP, any two out of three are possible, but no mechanism can satisfy all three.
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