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This paper investigates the adversarial vulnerabilities of EEG-based biometric authentication systems by developing adaptive attack algorithms that manipulate EEG recordings without knowledge of the underlying classifier. The study evaluates the effectiveness of these attacks across six public datasets under varying recording conditions, revealing significant differences in vulnerability among different neural signature methods. Key findings indicate that the susceptibility to spoofing attacks is heavily influenced by the specific task performed during EEG recording, highlighting critical security concerns for biometric systems.
Spoofing attacks on EEG biometrics can be executed without knowledge of the authentication system, revealing alarming vulnerabilities that vary drastically with recording conditions.
There is growing interest in the proposed use of EEG signals as biometric credentials, but thus far there has been little research on the reliability and security of such biometrics. Prior adversarial tests have focused on deep-learning classifiers and assumed attackers have full access to the classifier model. This has left unexamined other, more popular categories of neural signature methods as well as the more realistic case of an adversary having only black-box access to a classifier. In this paper we develop a collection of adaptive attack algorithms which learn to fool an authentication system via targeted alterations of stolen EEG recordings, without requiring any knowledge of the authentication system itself. Tested on 6 public datasets spanning three recording conditions (reacting to visual stimuli, imagining hand movements, and resting), it reveals that different signaturing approaches vary significantly in their degrees of vulnerability to adversarial attacks. We show that vulnerability to spoofing attack is greatly impacted by the recording conditions, with significant variation depending on task at time of recording. Finally, we provide recommendations for improving neural signature biometrics based on the results of our adversarial testing.