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This paper probes the introspective awareness of safety boundaries in LLMs by having them predict their refusal behavior before responding to harmful requests. Using signal detection theory (SDT) across 3754 datapoints and four frontier models (Claude Sonnet 4/4.5, GPT-5.2, Llama 3.1 405B), the study finds high introspective sensitivity (d'= 2.4-3.5) that drops at safety boundaries, with generational improvements in Claude models. Critically, high-confidence predictions enable 98.3% accuracy for well-calibrated models, suggesting a path to confidence-based routing for safety.
LLMs can predict their refusals with surprising accuracy, but their introspective abilities falter precisely when safety matters most.
Large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, but can they accurately predict when they will refuse before responding? We investigate this question through a systematic study where models first predict their refusal behavior, then respond in a fresh context. Across 3754 datapoints spanning 300 requests, we evaluate four frontier models: Claude Sonnet 4, Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5.2, and Llama 3.1 405B. Using signal detection theory (SDT), we find that all models exhibit high introspective sensitivity (d'= 2.4-3.5), but sensitivity drops substantially at safety boundaries. We observe generational improvement within Claude (Sonnet 4.5: 95.7 percent accuracy vs Sonnet 4: 93.0 percent), while GPT-5.2 shows lower accuracy (88.9 percent) with more variable behavior. Llama 405B achieves high sensitivity but exhibits strong refusal bias and poor calibration, resulting in lower overall accuracy (80.0 percent). Topic-wise analysis reveals weapons-related queries are consistently hardest for introspection. Critically, confidence scores provide actionable signal: restricting to high-confidence predictions yields 98.3 percent accuracy for well-calibrated models, enabling practical confidence-based routing for safety-critical deployments.